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MONTANA GRIZZLY BEARS PROTEST EXPLORATORY
DRILLING IN WILDERNESS AREA

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-WILDLIFE LAW: The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the U.S. Forest Service
need not prepare an environmental impact statement to grant approval
of mining company's exploratory drilling project in Montana wilderness area and that such approval did not violate the Endangered
Species Act due to impact on grizzly bears. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678
(D.C. Cir. 1982)
INTRODUCTION
FactualBackground
The Cabinet Mountains Wilderness Area is a 94,272 acre tract located
in the Kanisku National Forest in northwestern Montana. Long recognized
as a wild, untrammeled region worthy of preservation, it was classified
as a "primitive area" in 1935 and became a "wilderness area" with the
enactment of the Wilderness Act in 1964.' The Cabinet Mountains Wilderness is currently managed by the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, under the supervision of William E. Morden,
Forest Supervisor, Kootenai National Forest.
The Cabinet Range supports a small, but potentially viable population
of about twelve grizzly bears (Ursus arctos horribilis). The historical
distribution of grizzlies may have extended across the North American
continent, 3 with a population as high as 1.5 million. 4 Today there are
only about 1,000 bears south of the Canadian border in six scattered
populations in parts of Idaho, Montana, Washington and Wyoming .5
These bears require vast areas for their natural ranging habits (up to 280
square miles per bear), 6 and thrive best when isolated from humans. 7 But
the continued encroachment of man, with increased recreation, logging,
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mining and energy development, has reduced the bears' natural habitat
until it is in danger of extinction. Experts have estimated that the grizzly
bear could disappear from the contiguous forty-eight states in the next
thirty to forty years.' In 1975 Congress recognized the precarious future
of the grizzly, and listed it as a threatened species under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA). 9
In addition to grizzly bears, the wilderness contains deposits of copper
and silver. The American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO),
a mining corporation, holds 149 unpatented mining claims totalling 2,980
acres, most of which are located within the wilderness area. "0 The Wilderness Act permits mineral exploration and mining in wilderness areas,
but the right to appropriate mineral claims terminates January 1, 1984.''
Thus, ASARCO must prove the economic viability of its claims as required by the 1872 Mining Law 12 by the beginning of 1984 in order to
develop those claims after that date.
In 1979, ASARCO submitted a proposal to begin exploratory drilling
in the wilderness. The Forest Service reviewed and approved this proposal, and ASARCO drilled four holes from July to November, 1979. In
February, 1980 ASARCO submitted another exploratory drilling proposal
to be conducted during 1980-83. The 1980 program proposed to drill 36
holes on 22 sites, with a similar level of activity expected for the following
three years.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)I 3 requires the Forest
Service to complete an environmental analysis for any action which might
affect the environment. This analysis is documented in an environmental
assessment (EA). The Forest Service prepared such an EA for ASARCO's
proposal,' 4 and in its biological evaluation section indicated that the
impact of drilling, along with other uses of the area, such as logging and
recreation, could adversely affect the bears. The evaluation made fourteen
recommendations to reduce the potential effects of these activities, and
suggested the adoption5 of compensatory measures to positively influence
grizzly bear habitat. '
In addition to NEPA requirements, the Endangered Species Act 16 requires the Forest Service to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service
8. Schneider, Yellowstone, 56 NAT. PARKS 24 (1982).
9. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1981). "Threatened species" is defined at 50 C.F.R. §81.1(1): "Any
species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout
all or a significant portion of its range, as determined by the Secretary [of the Interior]."
10. Environmental Assessment, supra note 2, at 4.
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1976).
12. 17 Stat. 91, ch. 152, § I (May 10, 1872); 30 U.S.C. ch. 1 (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1976).
14. Environmental Assessment, supra note 2.
15. Some of those recommendations included restricted logging, no overnight camping, restricted
use of helicopters, restricting the period of drilling, and rehabilitating drill sites.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1976).
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(FWS) to determine potential effects of drilling on the grizzly bears. In
its biological opinion dated June 18, 1980, the FWS concluded that the
drilling proposal would "jeopardize the continued existence of the grizzly
bear"' 7 by restricting the bears' habitat, impairing reproduction, displacing the "bears from seasonally critical ranges, or cause human-induced mortality."' 8 The opinion went on, however, to outline mitigation
measures which would "completely compensate" adverse effects. Those
measures included: (1) no drilling or helicopter flights after September
30 of each operating season, (2) rescheduling or eliminating timber sales,
and (3) ordering seasonal or permanent road closures. 19
In May, 1980 the Forest Service completed the final EA. The assessment included the recommendations made in the FWS's biological opinion
and recommended additional measures. Those additional measures included: (1) a prohibition on overnight camping by ASARCO personnel
except in emergency situations, (2) daily and seasonal retrictions on
helicopter flights to avoid disturbing the bears during important denning
and feeding periods, (3) restrictions on helicopter usage to specified flight
corridors, (4) reclamation of drilling sites, (5) seasonal restrictions on
drilling activity in specified areas of the Wilderness, and (6) monitoring
of the project by Forest Service personnel. 20
In June, 1980 the Kootenai National Forest Supervisor, William E.
Morden, issued a "Decision Notice and finding of No Signficiant Impact"
thereby avoiding a more in-depth analysis of the proposal through the
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). An EIS is required only when a project significantly affects the environment. 2' The
Supervisor determined that an EIS was unnecessary because he believed
the project, incorporating the mitigation measures, would not create any
significant impact on grizzly bear habitats and the wilderness area in
general. Thus, ASARCO's drilling proposal was approved subject to the
mitigation measures contained in the final EA.
Environmental groups 22 made an unsuccessful administrative appeal
within the Forest Service and then filed suit in U.S. District Court.23 On
April 15, 1981 the District Court granted summary judgment upholding
the Forest Service Supervisor's decisions not to prepare an EIS and to
permit the drilling. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 4
17. Environmental Assessment, supra note 2, at 46.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id. at 46.
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c) (1976).
22. Plaintiffs included the Grizzly Bears, Western Sanders County Involved Citizens, Defenders
of Wildlife, Sierra Club and Cesar Hernandez.
23. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 510 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1981).
24. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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Legislative Background
There are primarily three statutes that are pertinent to this case: The
Wilderness Act of 1964,25 the Endangered Species Act of 1973,26 and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.27 The controversy involved in this case exemplifies the inherently schizophrenic nature of
these statutes in particular, and U.S. environmental law in general. Congress, while on the one hand attempting to protect the few remaining
remnants of our natural environment, also seeks to encourage the exploitation of natural resources within those areas. The obvious incompatibility of these competing policies becomes especially apparent in
environmentally sensitive situations such as the one presented in this
case.
The Wilderness Act establishes a National Wilderness Preservation
System whereby Congress may designate primitive, undeveloped, federally owned land as "Wilderness Areas." The system was created to
preserve "an enduring resource of wilderness" by administering these
lands "in such a manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use
and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of
these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character, and for the
gathering and dissemination of information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness .... "28 The act prohibits the use of motorized
vehicles or boats, landing aircraft, or structures and installations within
these areas. 29 Notwithstanding these protective measures, Congress went
on to ensure that such designation would not impair exploration and
mining of existing claims. 30 The act does require, however, that mineral
claimants satisfactorily establish their claims in accordance with applicable mining laws 3 I by December 31, 1983, or face federal withdrawal
of those claims. 32 After that date, no new claims may be acquired, but
claims already established may be developed into the future. Holders of
unpatented mining claims located within wilderness areas are consequently eager to validate their claims as quickly as possible.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1976).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-43 (1976, Supp. IV 1980).
27. 42 U.S.C.§4321 (1976).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
29. Id. at§1133(c).
30. Id. at § 1133(d)(2), (3). The provision allowing mining development in wilderness areas was
theresult
of acompromise between conservationists and industry. The complete prohibition of mining
and prospecting in wilderness areas was opposed by the American Farm Bureau, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Cattleman's
Association, the National Lumber Manufacturing Association, the Independent Petroleum Association, and the American Mining Congress. Foss, Problems in Federal Management of Natural
Resources for Recreation, 5 NAT. RES. J. 62, 73 (1965).
31. The 1872 Mining Laws generally require mineral claimants to prove their claims contain
economically significant bodies of ore. U.S. v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3), 36 C.F.R. § 293, § 252.15 (1981).
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The Endangered Species Act conserves "endangered" or "threatened"
species. The act, as amended, requires all agencies of the federal government to consider the economic and environmental consequences of
their decisions in order to ensure that the federal government does not
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species, or adversely modify critical habitat of such species.33 Under the
act, the federal agency must consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service
(or the National Marine Fisheries Service, depending on the species)
whenever the agency's action might affect an endangered or threatened
species. 34 The FWS then conducts an investigation and, within 90 days,
issues a biological opinion regarding the effects of the project on the
species. 35 If the proposed action will have an adverse effect, the opinion
will recommend "reasonable and prudent alternatives" which can be taken
in implementing the action. 36 The involved agency is then bound not to
"make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with
respect to the agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative
measures. . ... 3 The act also expressly extends to the general citizenry
the right to sue for violations under the act, 38 thereby avoiding standing
problems associated with the usual requirement of showing a concrete
personal injury.3 9
Possibly the most important statute involved in this litigation is the
National Environmental Policy Act. The act establishes the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to administer NEPA and to issue regulations. These regulations are binding on all federal agencies and, therefore,
an awareness of the regulations is essential to an understanding of the
statute.40
NEPA recognizes the destructive impact of resource exploitation on
the natural environment and seeks to promote the harmonious coexistence
of man and nature." NEPA's procedural requirements effectuate this goal
by providing that federal agencies analyze the potential effects of their
actions on the environment and incorporate this information into their
decision-making process. 42 A formal environmental impact statement must
be prepared by the involved federal agency for major actions "significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. . . . "4' An agency need
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. III 1979).
Id. at § 1536(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); 50 C.F.R. §402 (1981).
Id. at § 1536(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
Id.
Id. at § 1536(d) (Supp. II11979).
Id. at § 1540(g)(1) (1976).
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
Executive Order 11,991, May 24, 1977; 3 C.F.R. 123, 124 (1978).
42 U.S.C. §4331(a) (1976).
Id. at §4332(2)(B).
Id. at § 4332(2)(C).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

not prepare an EIS unless the proposed action has sufficiently significant
impact. If the agency official does not immediately recognize the need
for an EIS, the agency will prepare an environmental assessment to assist
him in determining whether an EIS is required.4 4 Although the threshold
question of whether to require an EIS is the responsibility of the administrative federal official, his decision is subject to judicial review based
on the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 4 5 Since judges are hesitant
to impose their judgment into the administrative decision-making process, 46 they will defer to the agency's decision if it is reasonable and
adequately supported. 4 7 Thus, an agency official has a considerable amount
of discretionary power to grant or deny the preparation of an EIS.
THE CABINET MOUNTAINS WILDERNESS DECISION
48
In Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson (Cabinet Mountains),
the D.C. Circuit considered primarily two issues: (1) whether mitigation
measures may be taken into consideration in determining whether or not
to prepare an EIS, and (2) whether the Endangered Species Act provision
for citizen suits mandates de novo review. With respect to the first issue,
the court rejected a statement by the CEQ to the effect that mitigation
should not be used to avoid an EIS. Instead, the court relied upon previous
judicial holdings permitting mitigation to be considered in determining
if an EIS is necessary. 49 The court also refused to interpret the ESA's
citizen suits provision as requiring de novo review. It ruled that the
appropriate standard of judicial review is the arbitrary and capricious
standard as provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 50
Analysis of the EIS Requirement/Considerationof
Mitigation Measures
As previously noted, NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS
for activities "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. . .. "51 To assist agencies in the determination of what is meant
by "significantly affects," the Council on Environmental Quality has
promulgated regulations defining those terms.5 2 The regulations, how44. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Assn. v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
46. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 556 (1978).
47. Id. at 558.
48. 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
49. Id. at 682.
50. Id. at 686.
51. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1981) ("significantly") and § 1508.8 (1981) ("effects"). Seealso Hanley
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835 (2d Cir. 1972).
52. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (1976), 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (1981).
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ever, do not address the appropriateness of using mitigation measures to
avoid the preparation of an EIS.
A few courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have permitted federal agencies to consider the effect of proposed mitigation measures in determining
whether the preparation of an EIS was necessary. 5 3 CEQ, recognizing
the danger of such a practice, issued a statement which interprets its
regulations in this area and sets forth a guideline for its use. In "Forty
Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy
Act Regulations," 54 CEQ said:
Mitigation measures may be relied upon to make a finding of no
significant impact only if they are imposed by statute or regulation,
or submitted by an applicant or agency as part of the original proposal. As a general rule, the regulations contemplate that agencies
should use a broad approach in defining significance and should not
rely on the possibility of mitigation as an excuse to avoid the EIS
requirement. 55
Thus, agencies are restricted in the use of this practice.
Applying the guideline to the facts in Cabinet Mountains Wilderness
v. Peterson, it becomes apparent that the Forest Service should not have
avoided the preparation of an EIS. The mitigation measures were not part
of the original proposal nor were they imposed by statute or regulation.
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the Forest Service's action
by rejecting the CEQ's guideline. The court viewed the guideline as an
informal statement without binding authority on either federal agencies
or the courts. 56
The court mistakenly rejected the CEQ guideline by relying on General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert.57 In Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
federal courts could give less weight to guidelines issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The primary basis for this
holding was that the EEOC had never been authorized by Congress to
promulgate rules or regulations. CEQ, by contrast, was specifically empowered by Congress to interpret NEPA and issue regulations. The court's
reliance on Gilbert was therefore misplaced.
When Congress has granted to administrative agencies the authority to
create regulations, the Supreme Court has consistently given great weight
to those agencies' interpretations of laws and regulations. In Bowles v.
53. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. U.S. Postal Service, 487 F.2d
1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir.
1982); City and County of San Francisco v. U.S., 615 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1980); Sierra Club
v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455, 468 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd. mem., 633 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1980).
54. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026 (1981).
55. Id. at 18,038.
56. 685 F.2d at 682.
57. 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
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Seminole Rock Co. ,5 in construing the meaning of a phrase in a regulation
(the General Maximum Price Regulation), the court relied upon interpretation contained in the bulletin "What Every Retailer Should Know
About the General Maximum Price Regulation" issued by the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration. The Court stated:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation
a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of
the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. The
intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some
situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between
various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative
interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.59
And in Udall v. Tallman,6" the Court stated that " [w]hen the construction
of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference
is even more clearly in order. "6 ' The Court has been especially deferential
to the CEQ's interpretations of NEPA. 62 Thus, the D.C. Circuit Court's
rejection of the CEQ's guideline in this case represents a departure from
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
Under NEPA, a federal agency prepares an EA in order to make a
threshold determination as to the "significance" of an action.6 3 An EA
involves a general review of the same factors that would be studied in
great depth for preparation of a detailed EIS. The CEQ has determined
that if the EA concludes that the project, as originally proposed, will have
a significant impact, a detailed EIS is required and proposed mitigation
measures cannot be used to avoid this responsibility. The agency's preparation of an EIS will therefore ensure that the final decision is based on
a complete analysis of all relevant factors. The courts should not substitute
their judgment for that of the CEQ as to when an EIS is required.
JudicialReview Under the Endangered Species Act
In addition to possible NEPA violations, the Cabinet Mountains court
considered whether the Forest Service's approval of the drilling project
violated the ESA. Appellants argued that the district court should not
have relied merely on the findings and conclusions of the Forest Service,
but should have conducted a de novo review, basing its decision on all
58. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
59. Id. at 413-14.

60. 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
61. See also, Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
62. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble,

417 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1974).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e).
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evidence presented at trial. The court rejected this argument and ruled
that the appropriate standard for judicial review under the ESA was governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which limited review
to the arbitrary and capricious standard. 64 Under this standard, a court is
confined to the administrative record, without recourse to independent
judicial factfinding, and may only determine whether the agency's de65
cision was reasonable and based on all relevant information.
The D.C. Circuit Court's rejection of de novo review is consistent with
the rulings of the Fifth, 66 Eighth 67 and Sixth Circuits. 68 All of these courts
rely on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (Volpe) 69 for authority.
In Volpe, the United States Supreme Court considered the appropriate
standard of judicial review for actions of the Secretary of Transportation
under §4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act and § 138 of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act. The Court found that federal agencies are
generally subject to judicial review under the APA70 and that the generally
7
appropriate standard of review is the arbitrary and capricious standard .
The Court recognized that the APA limits de novo review to two circumstances:
First, such de novo review is authorized when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate.
And, there may be independent judicial factfinding when issues that
were not before the agency are72 raised in a proceeding to enforce
nonadjudicatory agency action.
The Court noted, however, that "the generally applicable standards of
§706 [of the APA] require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial
inquiry. ,73
The Cabinet Mountains court focused on whether the special citizens
suit provision in the ESA would require de novo review of agency action.
Appellants argued that other laws with similar citizen suit provisions,
such as the employment discrimination laws, require de novo review, and
de novo review would therefore be appropriate under the ESA. In Chan64. 685 F.2d at 685. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Administrative Procedure
Act is set forth at 5 U.S.C.§ 706(2)(a) (1976).
65. U.S. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
66. National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 979 (1976).
67. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1304-05 (8th Cir. (1976).
68. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064, 1074 n. 21 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd on other
grounds, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
69. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
70. Id. at 410.
71. Id. at 413-14.
72. Id. at 415.
73. Id.
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dler v. Roudebush,7 4 the Supreme Court analyzed §717(c) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 717(c) provided that a federal
employee could file a civil action against an agency head after a final
administrative action. The court found that the plain meaning of the statute
75
and congressional intent required that judicial review should be de novo.
In analyzing the ESA, the CabinetMountainscourt noted that Congress
76
had not expressed an intention that judicial review should be de novo.
According to the court, the citizen suit provision "merely provides a right
of action to challenge the agency action alleged to be in violation of the
Act or to compel agency compliance with the requirements of the Act.
It does not direct trial courts to conduct de novo review in adjudicating
The court then concluded that since the ESA did
such actions. . . .
not specify a standard of review, the APA would govern, thereby dictating
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 78 Applying this standard, the court
found the Forest Service's decision to permit the drilling reasonable and
based on a consideration of the relevant factors. 7 9
Although a search of the ESA's legislative history is not informative
on this issue, de novo review may be implied from a careful examination
of the language of the act. A provision within the civil penalties section8"
specifies judicial review when there is a failure to pay a penalty. That
section specifically limits judicial review to the administrative record:
"such court shall hear such action on the record made before the Secretary
and shall sustain his action if it is supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole."'" It seems unlikely that Congress
intended such a standard to be applicable to the act as a whole when it
provided for it solely in the civil penalties section.
Regardless of the appropriate standard for judicial review under the
ESA, courts will generally give substantial weight to an agency's views
regarding environmental impacts. The evaluation of environmental impacts involves an analysis of scientific data as well as subjective value
judgments. Judges feel ill equipped to make such evaluations and consequently rely on the expertise and resources of federal agencies. Thus,
citizen and public interest group challenges to agency determinations
regarding environmental impacts are limited to showing procedural defects in the decision-making process.
"7

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

425 U.S. 840 (1976).
Id. at 862.
685 F.2d at 687.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id. at 687.
16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (1976).
Id.at § 1540(a)(1).
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CONCLUSION
The Cabinet Mountains decision illustrates the great deference courts
will give to administrative decisions concerning environmental impact.
The case is also indicative of the widespread and persistent pressure by
industry to develop natural resources in wilderness areas, and the permissive policies of the Administration to permit such development. The
judiciary should not take over the managerial functions from the federal
government. But when the Forest Service's management policies wreak
havoc with the environment, the courts should become more active in
enforcing the spirit of American environmental laws.
Congress, in enacting the ESA, NEPA and the Wilderness Act, responded to substantial public interest in the protection of animals threatened with extinction, such as the grizzly bears, and in the preservation
of the remaining vestiges of America's natural environment. The provision
in the Wilderness Act providing for federal withdrawal of wilderness
lands from mining claims after December 31, 1983 was intended to
eventually terminate mineral exploration, keep mining to a minimum,
and leave wilderness areas unimpaired for future generations. Unfortunately, that very provision has combined with a management policy receptive to increased exploration and development to create a situation
which is highly conductive to private exploitation of natural resources in
wilderness areas.
Mining is occurring today in wilderness areas. Sludge ponds, pipelines,
water tanks, drill sites and mining excavations supplant irreplaceable
natural wonders. Seismic blasting, the roar of earth-moving equipment,
the pounding of diesel-powered drill rigs, and the clatter of helicopters
invade tranquility and solitude. The odor of diesel fuel takes the place
of the sweet, fresh smell of the mountains, and construction crews replace
threatened life forms, such as the grizzly.
These changes are not going unnoticed, however. Public interest groups
and concerned citizens, such as the plaintiffs in this case, continue to
monitor the injury to natural areas and to bring their concerns to the
attention of the courts and elected representatives. Although the courts
have been reserved in their involvement, Congress continues to respond.
For example, on December 20, 1982 Congress passed legislation 82 which
was designed to designate as wilderness the Apalachicola, Ocala and
Osceola National Forests in Florida, to prohibit phosphate mining in the
Osceola National Forest, and to compensate mining companies for their
interests in the phosphate. 8 3 Unfortunately, President Reagan vetoed this
82. H.R. 9, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982).
83. Cost of compensation estimated to be approximately $74 million by Sen. Paula Hawkins,
R-Fla., 40 Cong. Q. 3135 (Dec. 25, 1982).
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legislation on January 14, 1983. Congress also passed a law8 4 which bans
oil and gas leasing in both wilderness and wilderness study areas until
September 30, 1983. Such legislative action by Congress, coupled with
the continued surveillance of federal agency actions by public interest
groups provide a source of resistance to the wholesale despoilation of
America's great natural areas and limit injury to those rare species that
inhabit them.
JAMES P. BIEG

84. H.R. 7356, Pub. L. No. 97-394 (Dec. 30, 1982).

